



Weaponizing IoT Sensors: When Table Choice Poses a Security Vulnerability

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Motivation

- We investigate the question:

-“Whether a series of vibration sensors hidden under the keyboard, or table could be used to infer the text typed on the keyboard?”

- A new paradigm of **attack** introduced

Introduction

- An **attack to snoop PINs typed on the keyboard**
- Underside of keyboard is **rigged with small motion sensors (i.e., 1.5cm)**
- Investigation of attack behavior for **sensors hidden under tables**
 - **four commonly used table-top surfaces**
- Investigation of impact of **table rotation and translation on attack behavior**




Fig 1: Motion sensor

Threat Scenario

- Two variants of the attack:
 - with sensors, i) under keyboard and ii) under table (Fig 2)
- Attack would typically be executed by
 - spying on victim's keyboard inputs
 - an insider with frequent access to victim's computer
 - colleagues, office cleaners, roommates, employers, etc.
- For training data, the attacker has 2 options:
 - replicate the victim's setup
 - use the victim's very system for typing




Fig 2: Sensor placement under the keyboard and glass table .

Attack Design




Fig 3: Overview of our attack.

Data Collection I

- Sensors used: Witmotion's WT901BLECL model
 - stealthily attach under table or raised end of a keyboard (Fig 2)
 - has 3-axis accelerometer, gyroscope, angles and magnetic fields
 - transfers data to Android or Windows devices via Bluetooth
- Sensors placed under the numeric pad

Data Collection II

- Data collection involved 23 participants for all Experiments
- For training data:
 - typed 0 to 9, each 3 times
- For testing data:
 - mixed pins of 4, 6 and 8 digits length
 - typed 5 PINs of each length (total 15)

Four Different Table Representation




Fig. 4: Data collection on tables of four different table materials under which sensors have been attached.

Data Processing and Feature Extraction

- Attack is centered on identifying pauses and wrist motions following three steps:
 - i. initiate attack by holding hand still for $(t_1 \pm \varepsilon)$ seconds (as **opening pause**)
 - ii. writing letter “A” (or mimic writing “A”) and
 - iii. another pause of $(t_2 \pm \varepsilon)$ seconds (as **closing pause**)
- g_x is flagged as part of pause if $-T_h \leq g_x \leq T_h$

Evaluation



- Keystroke Inference Attack
- Detecting Keyboard Movements

Keystroke Inference Attack

- 10-class problem involving the numbers 0-9
- Different Surfaces
 - i. 2 sensors placed directly under the keyboard.
 - ii. Keyboard placed on a **Plastic table** and 4 sensors placed under the table
 - iii. Keyboard placed on a **Glass table** and 4 sensors placed under the table
 - iv. Keyboard placed on a **Metallic table** and 4 sensors placed under the table


Keystroke Inference Attack

➤ Classifiers used

- i. XGBoost
- ii. Light GBM
- iii. Voting Ensemble

Classification Results

Fig 5: Keystroke inference performance on the 10-class problem involving the numbers 0-9.



- Sensors under keyboard
- Sensors under Plastic table
- Sensors under glass table
- Sensors under metal table

Classification Results II




Fig 6: Confusion Matrix for the Voting Ensemble when the sensor was under the keyboard

Accuracy-Distance Relation






Fig 7: Accuracy-Distance relation for the Voting Ensemble when the sensor was under the keyboard.

Detecting Keyboard Movements

➤ Keyboard Rotation




➤ Keyboard Translation




Detecting Keyboard Movements II

➤ Keyboard Rotation



➤ Keyboard Translation



Thank You

